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Abstract
This paper reviews recent legislative and regulatory developments in South Africa and the United 
Kingdom, notably the South African Draft Convergence Bill and the UK’s Communications Act 2003. 
The author considers these in the context of an international trend of legislating for “convergence” 
and focuses on the status of Internet regulation in both national jurisdictions. The argument is in 
favour of a regime of “general authorisation” of entry to electronic communication markets, rather 
than entry conditional on speciﬁc conditions of licence. The consequences of such an argument 
are explored in the context of South Africa. By considering John Rawls’s arguments for “justice as 
fairness”, the author assesses the impact of such policy alternatives on equity and universal service; 
and concludes that Rawls’s arguments, while powerful and in some important respects persuasive, 
presume a ﬁxed quantum of resources and do not, therefore, apply well to telecommunications. 
The conclusion is that Rawlsian arguments are insufﬁciently sensitive to the effects of the “network 
externality” and the opportunities presented by innovative tarifﬁng, and that their application to 
problems of communications equity can thus lead to sub-optimal outcomes.
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Introduction
In this article, I review and compare the recent initiatives in South Africa and the United Kingdom 
(UK) to legislate and regulate for convergence. I take “convergence” to mean an increasing 
substitutability between hitherto separate media of communication and a consequential weakening 
of Governmentsʼ ability to set terms for entry to communication markets. Recent UK legislation 
reﬂects this presumption and leans towards promotion of entry, in order to foster competition, 
whereas South Africa remains more strongly oriented towards entry control. At ﬁrst sight, South 
Africaʼs policy orientation seems justiﬁed in the interests of improving access to communication 
(universal service) and in the interests of equity. It seems to be consonant with John Rawlsʼs 
principle of “justice as fairness” and acting to advance the interests of “the advantage of the least 
favoured”. However, through consideration of a concrete example of telecommunications network 
architecture and tarifﬁng, I suggest that a Rawlsian model may not produce optimal outcomes. 
I argue instead for the potentially superior ethical merit of a regime of “general authorisation” of 
market entry, rather than entry on speciﬁc licence conditions (e.g. conditions designed to improve 
equity and universal service), and conclude that Rawlsʼs model of justice as fairness is insufﬁciently 
dynamic. 
Both South Africa and the UK have recently published Bills aimed at improving their respective 
regulatory regimes for convergence. The UKʼs bill was adopted by Parliament and the resulting Act 
– the Communications Act 2003 – became law on 29 December 2003. Thus far, South Africa has 
not progressed its Draft Convergence Bill of 2003 into law but in other respects South Africa has led 
developments, not least by establishing its converged regulator, the Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa (ICASA), in 2000 – three years before the UKʼs Ofcom opened for 
business. 
“Convergence” means different things in different places and other countries have also established 
regimes of converged regulation. Several European Union (EU) member states  – Finland 
and Italy, for example – have established a “converged” regulator. And the United Statesʼ 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Canadaʼs Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) are also cases in point. But what is meant by regulating 
for convergence is not always the same. The Finnish FICORA, for example, has responsibility for 
regulating postal services (whereas in the UK postal services are the responsibility of PostComm) 
and Italyʼs AGCOM has more responsibility for press regulation than does either the UKʼs Ofcom or 
South Africaʼs ICASA. Germany is different again and proposes an integrated regulator for the network 
industries (electricity, gas and telecommunications), whereas both Ofcom and ICASA regulate only 
communications. Further, the organisational structure of apparently “converged” regulators may also 
differ in signiﬁcant respects; some “converged” regulators maintain organisational arrangements 
that map closely onto “unconverged” media – what we might call “legacy” media distinctions (the 
FCC is a case in point, with bureaux for media, wireless and wireline communications), while others 
have striven to emancipate their internal organisational arrangements from “legacy” media type 
distinctions (AGCOM, for example, has commissions for infrastructures and networks and services 
and products).
Convergence is shorthand for the coming together of hitherto distinct infrastructures and content 
streams into a single, interconnected network running on common standards and carrying a single 
digital bitstream  – an instance of what Wikipedia calls the merging of “information technologies 
... to become a united whole”.1  But convergence is not just a process of integration; it is also 
a growing substitutability between media, platforms and distribution infrastructures. As hitherto 
distinct elements become acceptable substitutes for one another, so markets and media converge 
and a regulatory regime – based on distinctions between technologically distinct media, such as 
1 At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_%28technology%29, accessed on 01 November 2004.
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wireless broadcasting, wired telephony, the letter post and email, hard copy newspapers and online 
news services) – loses its power to secure the goals for which it was established. Hence, therefore, 
the tendency to adopt a single set of competition based principles when legislating and regulating 
for convergence.
The UK Communications Act 2003 is the latest stage in an uneven, protracted but seemingly 
inexorable, transition from a UK electronic communications regime of monopolies to one based on 
competition. Fifty years ago, the UK had a monopoly, state owned broadcaster and a monopoly, state 
owned telecommunications service provider (with the quirky exception of the city of Hull, where a 
municipally owned telecommunications monopoly operated) as well as a postal monopoly. In 2004, 
none of these monopolies remain. Fifty years ago competition in UK media and communications 
was conﬁned to the press sector, and there arrangements could most charitably be described 
as oligopolistic. Price competition was weak and entry was restricted due to a combination of 
distribution monopolies, very high entry costs, union closed shops and so on.
The UK print sector is still oligopolistic, but less so than before. A number of new dailies and 
Sundays have entered the market (although local newspaper markets have tended to become 
more subject to monopoly, and ownership of local titles has become increasingly concentrated), 
the most striking example of which is The Independent, owned by a ﬁgure familiar to students of 
the South African press, Sir Tony Oʼ Reilly. But in electronic communications, 20 years or so after 
liberalisation, the end of monopoly has come. The UK has literally hundreds of telcos and scores 
of television channels and radio stations. And in March 2004 competition in UK postal services 
entered a new stage, with Deutsche Post securing access to the Royal Mailʼs distribution network. 
Postal services are “interconnecting” in the same way as telecommunications networks.
The process of liberalisation began in 1954, when the UK established a commercial challenger, 
ITV (Independent Television), to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) monopoly. In 1984 the 
Telecommunications Act enabled competition to emerge and challenge the incumbent monopoly 
British Telecom (BT), ﬁrst through duopolistic competition and then through full competition. 
Liberalisation has produced creditable results. In the UK, voice telephony teledensity is close to 
100%; 75% of UK adults own or use a mobile (cellular) telephone (Oftel 2003); 48% of UK homes 
have Internet access and 18% have broadband; 56% of adults are regular users of the Internet; and 
61% have used the Internet at some time (e-envoy, 2003: 6-7).  However, the old state monopolies 
still have high market shares. In ﬁrst quarter 2003-4 in the ﬁxed-line telephony market, BT had 
57% of calls and 82% of lines (Oftel, 2003a) and the BBC has a 38% share of the television ﬁnal 
consumption market and 53% of the radio market.2 The story in some important sectors is thus one 
of transition from monopoly to oligopoly rather than from monopoly to real competition.
Nonetheless, the strength of the incumbents notwithstanding, the UK has experienced a decisive shift 
in its organisational paradigm. Rather than controlling market entry it has moved, with the qualiﬁed 
exception of broadcasting, to a regime of general authorisations, where market entry is encouraged 
in the interests of promoting competition rather than controlling entry through licensing. This, and 
the ofﬁcial embrace of the doctrine of “convergence” manifested in the creation of an integrated (or 
more exactly not wholly disconnected), policy and regulatory regime is fully consonant with trends 
in the EU – notably those embodied in the 2002 telecommunications “liberalisation package”.3 
2 Radio share data at www.rajar.co.uk/INDEX2.CFM?menuid=9, accessed on 11 August 2003. Television share data derived 
from ITC Annual Report, 2002 at:
www.itc.org.uk/itc_publications/annual_report/2002/Overview_of_Commercial_TV.asp#market_size and 
www.itc.org.uk/latest_news/press_releases/release.asp?release_id=683, accessed on 11 August 2003.
3 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2002, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c).
 
25 26
The UK Communications Act 2003
The Communications Act 2003 may be the longest Act ever to appear on the UK Statute Book 
– it has 411 clauses and 19 schedules and prescribes at least 260 separate duties for Ofcom. 
There is thus room for doubt as to whether the Government has succeeded in its aim to “simplify 
the regulatory framework” (DTI/DCMS, 2002: 3). Mercifully, the South African Draft Convergence 
Bill is considerably shorter with only 68 sections! The length and complexity of the UK Act and the 
number of duties it prescribes for Ofcom means, as the outgoing Chief Executive of the Independent 
Television Commission stated, that Ofcom cannot but exercise discretion in prioritising its duties:
 Ofcom has reminded us that Parliament asked it to deregulate while giving it some 260 duties, double those of 
its parent bodies. Wisely, Ofcom has committed itself to less but more effective regulation, aiming at strategic 
interventions to achieve bundles of results (Hodgson, 2003: 10).
Furthermore, the new policy framework established under the Act seems poorly endowed with the 
“resilience and adaptability for the future” (DTI/DCMS,4 2002: 3) that the sponsoring Secretaries 
of State sought to achieve. This is not least because the Act is drafted to exclude the Internet – a 
curious omission, perhaps, in an Act that is supposed to be both forward looking and technologically 
neutral, but one of which the Government was fully aware. Indeed, the sponsoring Secretaries of 
State themselves stated, “it is not the intention ... to extend regulation into the Internet” (DTI/DCMS, 
2002: 48). 
The exclusion of the Internet from Ofcomʼs jurisdiction will mean that regulation in the UK will not be 
fully “converged” (or technologically neutral) because video signals transmitted over different paths 
will be differently regulated. “Broadcast” (whether over a wired or wireless infrastructure) signals 
will fall under the jurisdiction of Ofcom, but the same content, if accessed over the Internet, will not.5 
The Act further discriminates between different technologies, for example, clause 316 provides 
Ofcom with powers to direct holders of broadcasting licences – but does not empower Ofcom 
to do the same to providers of electronic communication services. Many of these confusing and 
contradictory provisions are owed to Parliament, for the Act was extensively discussed in both the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords and also by a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee. 
Consequently, some provisions of the Act, notably on broadcasting, reﬂect the particular concerns 
of individual Members of Parliament (and of successful lobbyists). 
4 Department of Trade and Industry/Department of Culture, Media and Sport.
5 The ofﬁcial Explanatory Notes to the Act state that “material from a stand alone site, whether it be text, web-cast or video 
images” shall be excluded (Parliament, 2003, clause 526). This contrasts interestingly with the provisions in the South African 
draft Convergence Bill, in which content is deﬁned as “any sound, text, still picture, moving picture or other audio-visual 
representation, sensory representation or any combination of the above which is capable of being created, manipulated, 
stored, retrieved and communicated electronically, but excludes content contained in private communications between 
consumers” (Republic of South Africa, 2003, Section 1).
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The UK Act can be best understood as a move to a regime of competition based regulation of the 
electronic communications sector but with ﬁve main areas of exception to this principle. The Act 
liberalises electronic communications markets by: 
• establishing a regime of general authorisations rather than specific licences – except for 
broadcasting;
• liberalising national, and concentration of, ownership regulation (but retaining some 
prohibitions of concentration of ownership and introducing a public interest test for certain 
cross-media mergers); and
• introducing spectrum trading.
The Act establishes Ofcom as the lead competition authority (sharing concurrent powers with the 
Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, or OFT). However, as the No. 10 Strategy Unit (i.e. the Prime Ministerʼs Ofﬁce) 
has observed, Ofcomʼs most important sectoral competition powers derive from transposition of the 
relevant EU Directives in the Act:  
 In dealing with SMP,6  Ofcomʼs powers will be largely determined by the EU regulatory framework. This framework 
restricts the majority of regulatory activity to those instances where there is SMP as identified by the process of 
market reviews (Strategy Unit, 2002: 66). 
The EU Directives “transposed” through the Communications Act 2003 – notably the liberalisation 
package of 2002 – have given Ofcom considerably stronger powers as a competition regulator 
than those enjoyed by its predecessors. Moreover, Ofcomʼs competition powers have also been 
strengthened (compared to those enjoyed by its predecessors) by the UKʼs Competition Act 1998 
and the Enterprise Act 2002. 
However, the Act identiﬁes ﬁve major areas of exception to the general governing principle of 
competition based regulation. These are:
• spectrum policy;
• content regulation;
• universal service obligation (USO);
• ownership regulation; and
• public service broadcasting.
The Actʼs provisions, notably in its treatment of these areas of exception, reﬂect the well founded 
belief that markets and competition will not always be sufﬁcient to realise acceptable social and 
democratic outcomes. In respect of the newspaper press, the UK market has been less subject 
to state management than have its electronic communications markets – state intervention in the 
newspaper market has been conﬁned to cross-media and concentration of ownership regulation. 
The Communications Act 2003 continues to provide for media ownership regulation, although its 
requirements are less onerous than before. The most striking area in which the UK state still 
intervenes is in broadcasting. That the two publicly owned public service broadcasters, the BBC and 
Channel 4, together account for close to 50% of both radio and television consumption, indicates 
the high level of intervention in the broadcasting market. 
6 Signiﬁcant Market Power.
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The South African Draft Convergence Bill
Turning to the South African Draft Convergence Bill; it is necessary to state that a visitor should 
exercise caution when commenting on a hostʼs proposals. Comment always implies a norm and 
may sometimes veer into unwelcome and inappropriate prescriptiveness – whether by implication 
or direct injunction. It is uncomfortable for all to hear “oughts”, implicit or explicit, issuing from 
the mouth of one who has neither to live with the consequences of his or her proposals nor is as 
deeply embedded in the relevant milieu as are his or her hosts. Nonetheless, I think it better to say 
something rather than nothing and so I shall turn now, somewhat difﬁdently, to South Africa. 
As in the UK, South Africa has beneﬁted from recent entries to the national newspaper market. 
Indeed, South Africa has enjoyed more new entrants to the newspaper market than has the UK. 
Nonetheless, the welcome growth in South African titles does suggest that sometimes resources 
can be spread too thinly. The segmentation of South Africaʼs newspaper markets – by class, region 
and language – mean, as Allister Sparks7 observed, that “there are too many low-circulation 
newspapers feeding off a relatively small advertising cake. The consequent shortage of revenue 
means newsrooms are understaffed” (2003: 92). However, in other domains South Africaʼs 
communications markets appear less open. Telkom still enjoys a monopoly in provision of ﬁxed-
line telecommunication services (in spite of Telkomʼs licensed period of exclusivity being scheduled 
to end in 2002) and has been able to set the terms for entry to some related and adjacent markets. 
The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), with a c 71% share of television viewing and 
75% of the radio market (SABC Report, 2002-3),8  is also strikingly dominant.
The South African Draft Convergence Bill identiﬁes 17 principal objectives (clause 2), including:
• universal provision of communication services and connectivity for all (2);
• encouragement of investment and innovation (3); and
• promotion of competition (5).
These, and the 14 others, are worthy objectives. But their number suggests that ICASA will have 
to exercise a considerable body of expert judgement and regulatory discretion, for goals such as 
these are not always easily reconciled. However, I shall focus on South Africaʼs choice to control 
market entry through licensing of electronic communications providers in contrast to the UKʼs move 
to a regime of general authorisations (except in some areas of broadcasting).
Why licence? The South African Draft Bill sets out the reasons. Essentially they are to:  
• manage spectrum and standards (clauses 35-39);
• impose conditions of licence – empowerment, diversity of communities involved in 
provision (clause 14 and objectives 7 and 15); and
• realise specific objectives of:
 ° universal provision of communication services and connectivity for all (2);
 ° safeguarding, enriching and strengthening the cultural, political, social and   
 economic fabric of South Africa (8); and
 ° promoting a broad range of content services in all official languages –providing a   
 diversity of news, views, information and entertainment to meet the content needs  
 of all South Africans (16).
7 Formerly Editor of the Rand Daily Mail (1977-1981).
8 SABC public service radio has a share of c 62%; SABC commercial radio a share of c 13%; SABC public service television 
has a share of c 56%; and SABC commercial television a share of c 15%.
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The Draft Bill also proposes measures to liberalise markets, to ensure entrants have access to 
essential facilities on reasonable terms (40-52), to establish a complaints procedure and to advance 
consumer interests (clauses 53-60), although the latter measures do not, as currently drafted, 
provide adequately for consumer redress. However, despite the fact that the Draft Bill strengthens 
ICASAʼs independence and authority by removing the requirement for ICASA regulations to be 
approved by the Minister,9 powers continue to be reserved (Section 7) for the Minister in respect 
of:
• spectrum management;
• USO; and
• international obligations.
These principles are not dissimilar to those embodied the UK Act. Where differences begin to 
emerge are in the South African proposals for Ministerial powers of direction on:
• application of new technology;
• financial regulation (presumably rate of return for licensees); and
• pace and extent of network liberalisation.
The South African Draft Bill speciﬁes a number of different classes of licence (although it is not 
always clear quite what distinguishes one class of licence from another) and the criteria for awarding 
provide (at 14.2) for empowerment of historically disadvantaged groups rather than, for example, 
prioritising network rollout, USO or development of competition. Concern appears to focus more on 
who shall have access to the artiﬁcially created scarce resource of the licence rather than on those 
to whom services should be extended. 
The Draft Bill proposes to extend established licensing requirements in respect of content services 
(section 13.3.a). Content is deﬁned in the Draft Bill as:
 any sound, text, still picture, moving picture or other audio-visual representation, sensory representation or any 
combination of the preceding which is capable of being created, manipulated, stored, retrieved or communicated 
electronically but excludes content contained in private communications between consumers (definition in clause 
1).
As drafted, this appears to be a signiﬁcant extension of Ministerial powers of prior restraint. Happily, 
Minister Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri has disavowed this intention, since such provisions have an obvious 
potential to chill South Africaʼs Constitutionally protected principle of freedom of expression. 
Of course, it is not yet clear what the future of the South African Draft Bill is to be. But the extant 
published draft is an interesting marker of a modest shift towards a new sort of regime in South 
Africa. Section 15, for example, provides for some unspeciﬁed types of service to be provided 
without a licence. However, the Draft Bill does not tackle some of South Africaʼs major policy 
challenges; notably, how to optimise use and development of existing assets such as Sentechʼs 
wireless networks (which might provide a basis for a third public telecommunication network) and 
the Eskom and Spoornet/Transtel infrastructures that are to form the basis for the long delayed 
Second Network Operator (SNO). Still less does the Draft Bill facilitate further market entry – entry 
9 The principles of transparency and consultation are weakly present in section 7.7, where the Minister is not required to 
consult either ICASA or more widely.
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that would enable new providers (with appropriate regulation to ensure that incumbents do not 
anti-competitively lever their market power) to compete away rents, if any, enjoyed by the Telkom 
incumbent and any second and/or third public networks.
The Internet sector in South Africa
The absence of such measures underpins the concerns expressed by South African 
telecommunication users – not least by key players in the Internet sector. Consider some 
representative critiques of the absence of competition in ﬁxed-line telecommunication and related 
markets:
 The biggest issue in all our lives is the Telkom issue. It has become huge. If the government doesnʼt do 
something soon, Telkom could destroy this whole market ... Itʼs ridiculous; your monopoly supplier is your biggest 
competitor.10  
 The biggest inhibitor is the high price of bandwidth. Small businesses ideally need unlimited bandwidth at a fixed 
price in order to make it work for them and their customers.11
Such criticsʼ concerns seem well founded. South Africa has c 3.7 million Internet users, but access 
growth rates are in decline – in 2003 connectivity grew only c 6% whereas, in previous years, 
growth rates were higher. In 2002 growth was 7% and in 2001 20% (World Wide Worx, 2004: 62). 
South African Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are classiﬁed as VANS (Value Added Network 
Services) and are thus required to obtain facilities from Telkom (which also competes in the ISP 
market) for a key input. An estimated 70-80% of ISP costs are the VANS charges paid to Telkom 
(Gillwald, 2004: 28). It is not surprising, therefore, that the non-Telkom sector of the South African 
VANS market has declined. In 2004 the South African Competition Commission found Telkom 
had acted anti-competitively and recommended a ﬁne of 10% of turnover (c R3.7 billion). The 
recommendation is now under consideration by the Competition Tribunal but changes have not yet 
taken effect.12  
I focus on the Internet for two reasons. First, it is paradigmatic of convergence – the driver of 
re-regulation and the ﬂood of new communications law around the world of which the UK and 
South African initiatives are representative. Kevin Werbach, of the United Statesʼ Federal 
Communications Commissionʼs Ofﬁce of Plans and Policies (FCC OPP), crisply focused this 
proposition in his challenging analysis of the impact of the Internet on both communications 
markets and communications regulation. Werbach contended: “The Internet is substitutable for all 
existing media. In other words, the Internet potentially poses a competitive threat for every provider 
of telephony, broadcasting and data communications services” (1997: 1).
10 Mike Brierly, Managing Director, MTN Network Solutions, in World Wide Worx, 2004: 96.
11 Says Perlman, at www.itweb.co.za/sections/internet/2003/0312051041.asp?O=S&CiRestriction=leon%20perlman, 
accessed on 30 March 2004.
12 See Bloom (2003) for melancholy conﬁrmation that the time taken for competition authorities to hand down judgements 
may be protracted.
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My second reason for focusing on the Internet is because it in turn focuses a fundamental ethical 
issue in communications policy, to which I will now turn. It might be objected that competition based, 
converged, regulation and pro-Internet policies, which would mitigate the problems that I have 
indicated above, would cut across South Africaʼs USO. When 70% of South African households 
lack ﬁxed-line connectivity, why focus on the minority, three and a quarter million or so, of South 
African Internet users?13 
Here the issue is the extent to which the claims of the un-telephoned and Internet users are rival 
claims. They may be thought to be so. It would be hard to argue that all the resources – human, 
ﬁnancial or material – required for advancing the interests of Internet users are irrelevant to the task 
of making wired voice telephony accessible to all South Africans. But it would also be hard to argue 
that the un-telephoned would not beneﬁt from the efﬁciency gains to the South African economy, 
the amortisation of network costs over larger volumes of trafﬁc and so on, which would accrue from 
a more efﬁcient and effective South African Internet. And, as I hope to show, the disadvantaged do 
stand to gain (although not immediately) from the establishment of advanced IP (Internet Protocol) 
networks.
Ethical issues
Determining the balance of advantage, or harm, that might accrue from, on the one hand, policies 
designed to improve the accessibility and functionality of the Internet in South Africa and, on the 
other, policies designed to extend voice telephony services to those who are currently denied them 
exempliﬁes one of the classic problems of utilitarianism. Here, as is often the case, it is difﬁcult to 
know which of rival courses of action will better achieve the classic utilitarian goal of the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number.
But USO is not just a utilitarian issue. It is also an issue of rights, fairness and justice. And here I 
want to ask whether, and if so in what circumstances, it would be unfair and unjust to make claims 
for the literate, comparatively wealthy and, doubtless, disproportionately white population of South 
African Internet users – when there are unsatisﬁed claims of the illiterate, poor and preponderantly 
black population lacking basic wired telephone service.
I will short circuit important empirical questions here – like the relative importance of wired versus 
wireless telephony; reasons for the decline in the number of Telkomʼs wireline subscribers (a loss 
of over 2 million subscribers on ﬁxed network during Telkomʼs period of exclusivity); and price 
increases of over 27% percent a year (despite stated efﬁciency gains,  including job losses of 
around 30 000). I will try to focus on what seem to me important, and not straightforward, questions 
of principle. I will draw on John Rawlsʼs inﬂuential arguments for “justice as fairness”, which 
have plausibly been claimed to have decisively re-orientated and re-invigorated modern political 
philosophy,14 and will explore how far Rawlsʼs ideas are applicable to some of the communication 
policy challenges faced by South Africa. 
13 An estimated 1.75 million corporate users, 1 million dial-up users and 0.47 million academic users (World Wide Worx, 
2004: 61).
14 Rawlsʼs A theory of justice was ﬁrst published in 1971 and reissued, revised, in 1999. Will Kymlicka, for example, referred 
to Rawlsʼs theory of justice as giving rise to the “rebirth of normative political philosophy” (Kymlicka, 1990: 9). Rawls died in 
2002.
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Rawls and telecommunications policy
Let me begin by posing the question: Does justice require that everyone has the same? Or to 
frame the same question a little less starkly: Should public policy aim to minimise inequality? If so, 
it would seem straightforward to say that until everyone has basic telephone services (and other 
basic services) no-one should have enhanced services. Or, to put it less dog-in-the-mangerishly; 
new resources should be directed to improving the position of the worst off rather than improving 
the position of the better off. This, broadly I think, paraphrases the core principle of the systematic 
consideration of justice and fairness elaborated by Rawls. 
Rawls proposes a “difference principle” whereby all “social primary goods” – rights, liberties, 
opportunities, income, wealth and so on (Rawls, 1999: 79) are “to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured” (Rawls, 
1971: 303).15  The attractions of this position are obvious. But it is a remarkably absolutist position. 
Almost any expenditure or investment made that did not beneﬁt the absolutely worst off person 
would seem incompatible with Rawlsʼs principle of difference. 
One of Rawlsʼs principal interlocutors, Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, state and utopia (1974), set 
himself to arguing for the legitimacy of certain kinds of inequality. Nozick argued, among other things, 
that inequality that derived from the exploitation of legitimately gained advantages might be just. He 
gave the persuasive example of the wealth enjoyed by sports stars – wealth that has accrued from 
the willing payments of people like us. Are we, Nozick asked, to be denied the possibility of paying 
from our legitimately gained resources to watch Venus Williams, if the consequence of our doing 
so were to be growth in the inequality between Venus Williams and all of us? Surely not. However, 
unlike the difference in sporting skills (and the wealth that derives from them) between Venus and 
us, it would be hard to argue that social and economic inequality in South Africa generally derives 
from the exploitation of legitimately gained advantage; quite the reverse. One might thus conclude 
that Rawlsʼs principle of difference should prevail – distribution should be unequal and in favour of 
the massively least favoured in South Africa.16 
In terms of telecommunications policy (and leaving aside the rival claims of provision of universal 
access to clean water, electricity, healthcare, education and housing etc.) a rollout of universal 
access to voice telephony in South Africa should, under a Rawlsian set of values, seem to take 
priority over improvement of enhanced and Internet services. And, rather than a European style 
doctrine of general authorisation, the established South African model of restricted entry to 
telecommunication markets through licences with universal service conditions should continue to 
prevail. Here, let us leave aside for a time the obdurate empirical question of the effectiveness of 
South Africaʼs USO policies (see Gillwald, 2003) and stick to the issues of principle. 
15 I quote from the ﬁrst version of A theory of justice, because in his revisions Rawls softened this deﬁnition subsequently 
formulating it as “all social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of respect – are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyoneʼs advantage” (Rawls, 1999: 54).
16 The South African Gini-coefﬁcient (an index of income disparity – the higher the numerical value of the Gini-coefﬁcient 
the greater the disparity between the income of the best and worst off) was 0.59 in 1995, an improvement from 0.68 in 1990 
(Whiteford & McGrath, 1994: 73). Income disparity among black households has, however, widened, as is indicated by the 
increase in the Gini-coefﬁcient from 0.35 in 1990 to 0.52 in 1995. Although the general distribution of income in South Africa 
has improved, the poorest of the poor have become even more impoverished, Anon, 1997: 56, from www.ngo.grida.no/soesa/
nsoer/issues/economic/driver.htm, accessed on 22 March 2004.
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Consider other objections to Rawls, ones I ﬁnd more persuasive than Nozickʼs in respect of the 
issues under consideration. Rawlsʼs model is undynamic – he constructs his distributional calculus 
as both a zero sum game and one where the goods that are up for distribution already exist. 
Rawls doesnʼt consider adequately the problem of creation of resources – in our case the provision 
of telecommunication infrastructures – and his system is, in consequence, static. Consider an 
example that will, I hope, illuminate this objection to Rawlsʼs arguments. 
We know that telecom tariff baskets are often constructed so that different classes of users pay 
different prices for the same service. Let us take a simple example: a straightforward two exchange 
network in which each exchange serves six customers and where the annual cost of the network is 
1920 accounting units (dollars, pounds, euros, rand, it doesnʼt matter). If costs are shared equally, 
each telephone user pays 13.34 accounting units per month for service. 
Figure 2.1: Illustrative 12 subscriber/2 exchange network (level pricing)
EXCHANGE EXCHANGE
• Annual Network cost 1920 units. If customers split costs equally each pays 13.34 per 
month.
Let us say that this is unaffordable for eight of the 12 customers (and let us call those eight 
“residential customers”). The four remaining customers (let us call them “businesses”) are left with 
all the costs (although these might fall somewhat as the number of customers falls – let us say to 
1 200 units) and are considerably worse off; instead of paying 13.34 units a month each now pays 
25 units. 
33 34
Figure 2.2: Illustrative 4 subscriber/2 exchange network
These remaining four customers, for whom prices have risen, will be better off if the eight lost 
customers return to the network and pay anything more than 7.51 units a month (reducing business 
customersʼ monthly charges to, at most, 24.98).17 Moreover, the business customers will beneﬁt 
from the “network externality” by being able to communicate with the eight residential customers 
who have been attracted back to the network.18 
Figure 2.3: Illustrative 12 subscriber/2 exchange network (rebalanced pricing)
EXCHANGE EXCHANGE
• Annual Network cost 1200 units. If customers split costs equally each pays 25 per 
month (i.e. each is worse off by 11.66 per month and can call/be called by fewer 
subscribers).
EXCHANGE EXCHANGE
• Annual Network cost 1920 units. 12 customers split costs unequally all are connected 
and benefit at, say, a price split of 
 4 customers pay 24.98
 8 customers pay 7.51
17 The sums do not add up perfectly; but let us say the difference is accounted for by the costs of regulation!
18 Fod Barnes ﬁrst developed this worked example, when a consultant at Oftel in the mid 1990s, and I have subsequently 
adapted and used it before (see Collins & Murroni, 1996).
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Intuitively, I think we feel fairness is satisﬁed if the customers least able to pay are charged less 
than those most able to pay. All are better off, and the utilitarians among us are satisﬁed, if we 
contrive a tarifﬁng scheme – such as that sketched above – that attracts and keeps as many 
people connected as possible. Rawlsʼs difference principle also seems to be satisﬁed; the unequal 
distribution is to the beneﬁt of the least favoured.
But the chances are that, in the real world, such a scheme will work only if the network is optimised 
for those who are paying the most. For they are the ones (le us call them the rich or business) 
without whom there would be no network. If they were to drop off the network,19 or the network did 
not exist in the ﬁrst place because regulation did not allow it to develop, the least favoured would 
continue to have nothing. 
Thus, does the network not have to be created for the high payers ﬁrst? And here we enter a space 
where we might feel unfairness is creeping back in. Yes, people are being treated differently; yes, 
priorities are being set to suit the advantaged (whether we call them businesses as I have done in 
this example, or we could call them the wealthy, the green, the blue or the white). But within these 
unequal arrangements there is the potential for all to be better off than they would otherwise be, 
even though, initially at least, the least favoured may not beneﬁt.  However, if we take a Rawlsian 
snapshot, static view, the initial expenditure on the network for the notional business users is 
illegitimate. It will not immediately beneﬁt the worst off. Indeed, some of the users may never 
beneﬁt. Perhaps they will die in the period between the construction of the network for the four 
business users and the notional second stage rollout of the network at marginal cost to the eight 
residential users. 
But establishing a network is a dynamic process. Inevitably, when something new arrives access to 
it will be unequal. The ﬁrst users are likely to bear signiﬁcant costs (and bear the risks of backing 
the wrong technology or application), and are unlikely to do so unless they perceive that they will 
beneﬁt. But their expenditure, and their demand, will provide the conditions in which others will be 
able to use the facilities established. The potential is there for the least well off to beneﬁt under 
inventive and unequal tarifﬁng regimes of the kind Iʼve sketched above. Moreover, this is how, 
historically, electronic communications networks have developed, whether we take the history of 
ﬁxed, mobile or Internet as our exemplar.
Let us extend the argument a little further. I have not considered what economists call the 
“externalities” that attach to the existence of well functioning telecommunication networks. I will not 
rehearse them all here but rather refer to the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) of the African National Congress (ANC); that programme recognised the importance of the 
positive externalities that derive from an efﬁcient and pervasive telecoms infrastructure. The ANC 
stated, “The telecommunications sector is an indispensable backbone for the development of all 
other economic sectors” (ANC, 1994: 34, paragraph 2.8.3).20  Even those who lack access to 
the telecommunications infrastructure are likely to beneﬁt, albeit indirectly, from a well functioning 
telecommunications infrastructure. It is thus not always obvious that redistribution, e.g. on Rawlsian 
lines, is more effective than increasing productive efﬁciency as a means of improving welfare.
19 Redistributive tarifﬁng works, if there are no obstacles to establishing competing networks, only to the point where it is 
cheaper for high tariff users to remain on the network rather than to establish a new network.
20 The RDP document continued, “An effective telecommunications infrastructure which includes universal access is essential 
to enable the delivery of basic services and the reconstruction and development of deprived areas” (ANC, 1994: 34).
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In South Africa inequalities are grotesque. Arguing for importance of principles other than 
distributional equality doesnʼt mean redistribution is unimportant. But it has to be acknowledged 
that generally competition – rather than South Africaʼs conditions of licence based ﬁxed-line 
USO strategy – seems to have been more effective in extending voice telephony services to the 
excluded.21 Mobile telephones, originally envisaged as a toy for the rich with a possible South African 
market of 200 000 users, have now become the pre-eminent means of making voice telephony 
accessible to the excluded. South Africa has three competing cellular networks with c 14.4 million 
subscribers. Innovative tarifﬁng, community phone shops, and entrepreneurship by intermediaries 
has extended, and continues to extend, service. By contrast, Telkomʼs ﬁxed-line monopoly, justiﬁed 
because of the promise it offered to extend wireline service to the untelephoned, has seen a fall in 
the number of subscribers – with all the wasted investment and infrastructure that involves.
Entry control and universal service in South Africa
One of the chief rationales for entry control via licences has been to ensure delivery of the USO 
and this is, in principle, a persuasive ethical rationale. An important objection to a regime of 
general authorisation is that justice and fairness can only be achieved through restricted entry and 
attaching redistributional conditions to licences. But this argument seems to me to be open to two 
sorts of objections. First, the empirical; it is not apparent that superior levels of justice and fairness 
have been better secured in the South African ﬁxed-line market, where entry has been strongly 
constrained, than in the South African mobile market, where entry has been much less restricted. 
And second, the principled, Rawlsian, objection – that a general authorisation regime would not 
secure “the advantage of the least favoured” (Rawls,  1971: 303) – is ﬂawed; both because it 
derives from too static a vision of distributional justice and because it departs too far from the 
characteristics of electronic communication networks. It promises to excessively chill development 
and deny all beneﬁts that users might otherwise enjoy – albeit unequally. 
Thus far, I think we have to acknowledge, the established South African licence based regime has 
not been notably successful in delivering the USO. Moreover, as Iʼve argued above, a Rawlsian 
insistence on the legitimacy of expenditure only when it beneﬁts the least favoured may lead to a 
blocked, static communications regime where, under Rawlsian principles, the investment necessary 
to create the infrastructures required for unequal pricing, which favours the least advantaged, may 
never be made. 
What might follow from a South African policy regime of general authorisations? Almost certainly 
there would be a more productive use of existing assets where economies of scope apply, 
permitting ﬁrms such as Eskom and Spoornet to offer public telecommunications services. These 
ﬁrms are slated as making up the core of the projected South African ﬁxed-line SNO, with Sentech 
as a possible Third Network Operator (TNO). And there may well be others. Telkom might well 
be incentivised under such a regime to put some of its underused assets – e.g. the unused loops 
connecting those who have dropped off its network – to productive use. Moreover, an open entry 
regime would mitigate the chilling effect of Telkomʼs un-customer friendly treatment of the VANS 
market – treatment that is plausibly seen as an important factor in South Africa lagging world Internet 
penetration and usage trends. An open entry regime would consequently be likely to reduce the 
deadweight of information search and transaction costs in the South African economy. 
21 Doubtless, some of the success enjoyed by the South African mobile network operators is due to the inadvertent “infant 
industry” subsidy accorded to the networks by the underpricing, relative to international comparisons, of South African mobile 
network licences. Gillwald (2004: 7) estimates that South Africaʼs Third Network Operator (TNO) paid c US$ 2.2 per head for 
its licence whereas Moroccoʼs SNO paid c US$ 39.47 per head.
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Voice over IP (VoIP), which would undoubtedly become more widely used under such a regime, 
would certainly erode Telkomʼs monopoly ﬁxed-line revenue base and its theoretical ability to cross 
subsidise socially desirable network rollout and use. But VoIP is happening anyway – and is probably 
unstoppable – and there is room for doubt as to whether the cross subsidy regime operated by 
Telkom has effectively rolled out and extended network access. Moreover, UK experience (and that 
in other countries where entry control has been reduced or eliminated) suggests that a ﬁxed-line 
incumbent may retain market dominance for a long time after it is subject to competition, making 
it both possible and justiﬁable for regulators to require greater commitment to social goals from 
dominant incumbents than from new entrants.
None of these possible, and in my view likely, benevolent outcomes of a regime of general 
authorisations are, in principle or necessarily, hostile to the key social objective of extending access 
to voice telephony throughout South Africa. Nor is such a regime incompatible with an old fashioned 
USO fund to accelerate the build-out of wired and/or wireless networks. General authorisation 
does not mean no regulation; rather, it means encouragement of entry under common conditions 
conducive to effective competition. There is no reason why a levy, similar to the existing levy 
of 0.5% on turnover (Telecom Amendment Act 2001, Section 27), should not continue cutting in 
when ﬁrmsʼ turnover exceeds an appropriate threshold. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that the 
aggregate resource available for underserviced areas would increase under such a regime of 
general authorisations plus USO levy. 
Conclusion
Let me draw two sets of conclusions. First, a pragmatic conclusion: there are good grounds to 
suppose that a South African policy of general authorisations plus USO levy would not worsen 
the lot of the underserved. Indeed it would probably improve it. And such a regime would also 
be friendlier to the South African economy than is the existing regime of wired monopoly and an 
uncertain future of duopoly. Some would certainly gain; the disadvantaged would not be worse off 
and might well be better off. Only a rather dog-in-the-mangerish ethics (and sometimes it seems 
Rawlsʼs ethics have that characteristic) would stand in the way.
And second, a conclusion of principle and one I am pleased to be able to make as an itinerant 
member of South Africaʼs leading university. The conclusion in principle is my modest chip in the 
towering ediﬁce of Rawlsʼs Theory of justice. His system of justice as fairness is, I think, a rather 
static system and one that leads to somewhat perverse conclusions when applied to electronic 
communication networks. 
My title refers to monopolies and oligopolies, and you will doubtless have been unsurprised to learn 
that I am against both, although I acknowledge that one can have too much of the good competition 
thing – as the current structure of the South African press would suggest. But evidence would 
suggest that greater beneﬁts do accrue from ready entry to markets than from restricted entry. And 
there is some strong evidence to suggest that South Africa is disadvantaged by lack of competition 
– that is by monopoly and/or oligopoly – in key market sectors. I would, therefore, suggest that a 
move to a regime of general authorisations is worth considering in South Africa. There seem to be 
good reasons to believe that such a regime would beneﬁt the economy generally, would not worsen 
the plight of the disadvantaged and, indeed, would provide a basis for them to enjoy future beneﬁts 
that would not otherwise be available. Neither the current licensing regime, nor that foreshadowed 
in the Draft Bill, both of which restrict entry, promise as much. 
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